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Abstract  
We propose a daily index of time-varying stock market uncertainty. The index is 
constructed after first removing the common variations in the series, based on recent 
advances in the literature that emphasize the difference between risk (expected 
variation) and uncertainty (unexpected variation). To this end, we draw on data from 25 
portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market value. This strategy considerably reduces 
information requirements and modeling design costs, compared to previous proposals. 
We also compare our index with indicators of macro-uncertainty and estimate the 
impact of an uncertainty shock on the dynamics of macroeconomic variables.  
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1. Introduction  
Uncertainty and risk have been primary concerns in economics, and among scientists in 
general, since the birth of modern science. Indeed, Bernstein (1998) goes as far as to 
claim that the interest in measuring and mastering the two phenomena marks the 
threshold separating modern times from the previous thousands of years of history.  
In economics, Frank Knight was the first person to postulate the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk on the grounds that the former cannot be described by means of a 
probability measure while the latter can. According to both Knight (1921) and Keynes 
(1921, 1939), economic agents inhabit an environment of pervasive uncertainty and, 
therefore, there can be little hope of quantifying or forecasting economic variables, or of 
even taking informed decisions that rely on quantitative measures of economic 
dynamics (in other words, probabilities are incommensurable).  
Today, the distinction between risk and uncertainty remains a lively topic for debate on 
the academic agenda. Indeed, several recent studies have attempted to explain decision- 
making under uncertainty, albeit oriented more towards the social conventions than 
towards the development of rational calculations. Accordingly, in this branch of the 
literature, there is a clear need to distinguish between the concepts, while measuring 
what can be measured and not losing sight of what cannot be quantified in probabilistic 
terms (Nelson and Katzenstein, 2014; Ganegoda and Evans, 2014; Taleb, 2007). 
Although of obvious importance in its own right, this extreme Knightian differentiation 
between risk and uncertainty leads to the impossibility of defining a probability space 
and prevents us from using any variation of the Ergodic Theorem in empirical studies. 
And this, in turn, leads to the impossibility of conducting any science at all (Hendry, 
1980; Petersen, 1996) or, at least, the kind of social science based on ‘measurement’, as 
has been fostered by the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics since its 
foundation1. 
However, confronted by this panorama, the profession has moved from this Knightian 
extreme (fundamental) view of uncertainty and adopted a more promising approach to 
the concept. In this new strand of the literature, uncertainty has generally been 
assimilated to a time-varying conditional second moment of the series under study, 
closely linked to underlying, time- varying, structural shocks, such as terrorist attacks, 
political events, economic crises, wars and credit crunches. Yet, despite this, the 
differentiation between risk and uncertainty in most instances is not properly dealt with. 
Our contribution can be thought of as an attempt to measure the ‘known’ and part of the 
‘unknown’, in the popular taxonomy of risk proposed by Gomery (1995). This author 
differentiates between the ‘known’, the ‘unknown’ and the ‘unknowable’, and 
highlights a traditional exaggerated focus on the former, while ignoring the other two 
categories. That bias can lead to misconceptions about the world around us, because the 
‘known’ constitutes only a very small fraction of what we see and face on our daily 
                                                        
1 ‘Science is Measurement’ was the original motto of the Cowles Commission (though it would later 
be changed in 1952 to ‘Theory and Measurement’). See Keuzenkamp (2004) and Bjerkholt (2014) 
for details about the history and methodology of econometrics and the role of the Cowles 
Commission and the Econometric Society in the transition of economics to a more formally based 
science.  
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decisions. Nevertheless, there is still the ‘unknowable’, which is clearly beyond the 
scope of this paper, since in this situation even the events defining the probability space 
cannot be identified in advance as pointed out by Diebold et al. (2010).  
In this paper we seek to make three specific contributions to the study of uncertainty. 
First, we propose a new index for measuring stock market uncertainty on a daily basis 
(or what we refer to as financial uncertainty). 2  The index considers the inherent 
differentiation between uncertainty and the common variations between the series 
(which we identify as risk). Recent advances in the field have identified the 
methodological tools for performing the task using factor models (Jurado, Ludvigson 
and Ng, 2015; henceforth JLN). These proposals, however, have tended to focus their 
attention on the use of macroeconomic variables to construct their indexes, as opposed 
to financial variables. Therefore, because of the low frequency of macroeconomic 
series, the proposals lack a desirable property of traditional proxies of uncertainty based 
on financial returns (such as VXO, VIX or credit-spreads): namely, practitioners and 
policy makers cannot trace their dynamics in real time.  
Our second contribution is to show how our financial uncertainty index can also serve 
as an indicator of macroeconomic uncertainty. We examine the circumstances under 
which our index might be thought to capture all the relevant information in the economy 
as a whole. We exploit the fact that the information contained in hundreds, or even 
thousands, of economic indicators can be encapsulated by just a few stock market 
portfolio returns. This circumstance makes the construction of the index easier, in terms 
of its information requirements, modeling design and computational costs, and it allows 
us to provide a high frequency uncertainty measure. The construction of our index, 
based on portfolio returns, for which there are significant and timely data, provides a 
better basis for analyzing uncertainty compared to other situations, in which this kind of 
information and frequency are absent. Therefore, the extension of the methodology 
beyond the stock markets must be approached with caution, since there is little hope to 
extract the uncertainty components of less timely data, in an accurate fashion. 
Finally, we analyze the dynamic relationship between uncertainty and the series of 
consumption, interest rates, production and stock market prices, among others. This 
allows us to further our understanding of the role of (financial or macroeconomic) 
uncertainty, and to determine the dynamics of the economy as a whole. Our empirical 
model allows us to analyze the extent to which traditional monetary policy can be 
trusted to manage situations of uncertainty. Thus, on the one hand, we document a 
significant and negative relationship between uncertainty and real variables such as 
production, employment and consumption; on the other, we find that the interest rate 
tends to decrease after an uncertainty shock while uncertainty decreases following a fall 
in the interest rate. However, this last effect only explains a small proportion of the total 
variation in the forecasted uncertainty.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, we review theoretical and empirical 
studies of uncertainty. In section 3 we describe the methodology used to estimate the 
uncertainty index. Our approach relies on generalized dynamic factor models and 
stochastic volatility (SV) devices. In section 4 we present our data and in section 5 our 
main results. We also relate our findings to macroeconomic dynamics by means of a 
vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. In the last section we conclude.  
                                                        
2 The daily index is available on www.ub.edu/rfa/uncertainty-index.  
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2. Related literature 
 
2.1. Risk, uncertainty, economic decisions and policy intervention 
The current paradigm for understanding uncertainty was developed within the 
framework of irreversible investment, in which a firm’s future investment opportunities 
are treated as real options and the importance of waiting until the uncertainty is resolved 
is emphasized. Hence, aggregate uncertainty shocks3 are thought to be followed by a 
reduction in investment, and possibly in labor, and, consequently, by a deterioration in 
real activity (Bernanke, 1983; Bertola and Caballero, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1996; 
Leahy and Whited, 1996; Caballero and Pindyck, 1996; Bloom et al., 2007; Bachmann 
and Bayer, 2013). Nevertheless, some studies point out that after the original worsening 
of the variables, a rebound effect related to a ‘volatility over-shoot’ may be observed 
(Bloom, 2009; Bloom et al., 2013). It is worth noting that these original impacts on the 
macroeconomic variables may be amplified as a result of financial market frictions 
(Arellano et al., 2012; Christiano et al., 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2014).  
The study of uncertainty is not confined to the firm’s investment problem. For example, 
Romer (1990) suggests that consumers may postpone their acquisition of durable goods 
in episodes of increasing uncertainty. Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Aghion et al. 
(2010) have studied the negative relationship between volatility and economic growth. 
The effects of uncertainty on equity prices and other financial variables have also been 
analyzed. In this stream, Bansal and Yaron (2004) provide a model in which markets 
dislike uncertainty and worse long-run growth prospects reduce equity prices. In the 
same line, Bekaert et al. (2009) find that uncertainty plays an important role in the term 
structure dynamics and that it is the main force behind the counter-cyclical volatility of 
asset returns. 
Additionally, there has been a revival of interest in examining the relationship between 
uncertainty and policy interventions. However, there is no clear consensus in this 
resurgent research agenda. Some authors conclude that the optimal monetary policy 
does not change significantly during episodes of crisis and that uncertainty about crises 
has relatively little effect on policy transmission (Williams, 2012), but others report that 
financial uncertainty plays a significant role in monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms (Baum et al., 2013; Bekaert et al., 2013). Neither is it clear whether a 
highly responsive or moderate monetary policy scheme is best when facing uncertainty. 
For instance, Williams (2013), in the same spirit as Brainard (1967), forwards the 
argument that, once uncertainty is recognized, some moderation in monetary policy 
might well be optimal. In marked contrast (albeit under a different notion of 
uncertainty), Fendoǧlu (2014) recommends a non-negligible response to uncertainty 
shocks.  
 
2.2. Empirical measures of uncertainty  
Empirical studies have frequently relied on proxies of uncertainty, most of which have 
the advantage of being directly observable. Such proxies include stock returns or their 
implied/realized volatility (i.e., VIX or VXO), the cross-sectional dispersion of firms’ 
                                                        
3 Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) explain possible sources of inefficiency in the investment 
process arising from idiosyncratic uncertainty, under high-powered incentives and risk-averse 
managers. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) also study the impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty shocks 
on business cycles.  
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profits (Bloom, 2009), estimated time-varying productivity (Bloom et al., 2013), the 
cross-sectional dispersion of survey-based forecasts (Dick et al., 2013; Bachmann et al., 
2013), credit spreads (Fendoǧlu, 2014), and the appearance of ‘uncertainty-related’ key 
words in the media (Baker et al., 2016; Alexopoulos and Cohen, 2015).4  
Although these uncertainty proxies have provided key insights to the comprehension of 
uncertainty, and have been reliable starting points for the analysis of the economic 
impacts of uncertainty on economic variables, most of them have come under criticism, 
most notably from Scotti (2016) and JLN. On the one hand, volatility measures blend 
uncertainty with other notions (such as risk and risk-aversion), owing to the fact that 
they do not usually take the forecastable component of the variation into account before 
calculating uncertainty. On the other, analysts’ forecasts are only available for a limited 
number of series. Moreover, it is not entirely clear whether the responses drawn from 
these surveys accurately capture the conditional expectations of the economy as a 
whole. The disagreement reported in survey forecasts could be more of an expression of 
different opinions than of real uncertainty (Diether et al., 2002) and even if forecasts are 
unbiased, the disagreement in analysts’ point forecasts is not generally equivalent to 
forecast error uncertainty (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010) 5 . Aimed at overcoming these 
shortcomings, a new branch of the literature has emerged, which proposes measuring 
uncertainty only after the forecastable component of the series has been removed 
(Carriero et al., 20156; Gilchrist et al., 2014; JLN).  
Our model takes into account the extraction of the contemporaneously forecastable 
component of the variation before calculating uncertainty, which is important in order to 
distinguish satisfactorily between uncertainty and risk. We also aim to construct 
estimations of uncertainty by deliberately adopting an atheoretical approach, in the 
same vein as JLN. Our study contributes to the existing literature by providing a daily 
measurement of uncertainty. This is important, because it means the market can be 
monitored in real time, while enabling the researcher to undertake event studies with 
greater precision including uncertainty as a variable. The literature notes that 
estimations of impacts extracted from event studies are much more precise and less 
noisy as the frequency of the data increases (Fair, 2002; Bomfim, 2003; Chuliá et al., 
2010).  
3. Methodology 
The construction of our uncertainty index consists of two steps. First, we remove the 
common component of the series under study and calculate their idiosyncratic variation. 
To do this, we filter the original series using a generalized dynamic factor model 
(GDFM). Second, we calculate the stochastic volatility of each residual in the previous 
step using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. Then, we average the 
series, obtaining a single index of uncertainty for the stock market, and possibly for the 
economy as a whole. In sections 3.1 and 3.2 below, we explain each step in detail.  
                                                        
4 Other studies, such as Shi et al. (2016), have used linguistics-based sentiment scores of the news 
releases to study the dynamics of stock volatility. 
5 Bachmann et al. (2013) and Scotti (2016) acknowledge these problems and address them by 
using additional proxies for uncertainty. Nevertheless, as noted by JLN, these studies focus on 
variation in outcomes around subjective survey expectations. 
6 These authors do not address the problem of measuring uncertainty directly, but still they use a 
closely related methodological approach to the one employed in this strand of the literature. 
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3.1. Idiosyncratic component extraction 
Following Bai and Ng (2008), let ? be the number of cross-sectional units and ? be the 
number of time series observations. For ? ? ??? ? ? and ? ? ??? ? ?, the dynamic factor 
model (DFM) can be defined as: 
??? ? ? ??????? ? ???,    (1) 
where ????? ? ?? ????????? ???????? is a vector of dynamic factor loadings of order 
?. When ? is finite, we refer to it as a DFM. In contrast, a GDFM allows ? to be infinite. 
Stock and Watson (2002, 2011) provide examples of the former and Forni and Reichlin 
(1998) and Forni et al. (2000) introduce the latter. In any case, the (dynamic) factors ?? 
evolve according to:  
?? ? ???????,     (2) 
where ?? are ??? errors. The dimension of???, denoted ?, is the same as that of ?? and it 
refers to the number of dynamic or primitive factors (Bai and Ng, 2007). 
The model stated in (2) can be rewritten in static form, simply by redefining the vector 
of factors to contain the dynamic factors and their lags, and the matrix of loads 
accordingly, as: 
?
?? ? ?? ?
?????
?? ? ???? ? ?? ?
?
?? ? ??,   (3) 
where ? ? ????? ? ???  and ? ? ???? ? ? ? ??? . Clearly, ?  and ?  are not separately 
identifiable. For any arbitrary ?? ? ?? invertible matrix ? , ??? ? ??????? ? ????? , 
where ?? ? ??  and ?? ? ???? , the factor model is observationally equivalent to 
? ? ????? ? ?. Therefore ?? restrictions are required to uniquely fix ? and ? (Bai and 
Wang, 2012). Note that the estimation of the factors by principal components (PC) or 
singular value decomposition (SVD) imposes the normalization that ?
??
? ? ?? and ??? is 
diagonal, which are sufficient to guarantee identification (up to a column sign 
variation). 
The GDFM is a generalization of the DFM because it allows a richer dynamic structure 
for the factors. It places smaller weights on variables with larger idiosyncratic 
(uncertainty) components. So that the idiosyncratic ‘error’ contained in the linear 
combination is minimized. In this way we ensure that the uncertainty component is 
purged from risk-related variations. 
Our first step enables us to estimate the idiosyncratic variation of the series????? ? ??? ?
????, where ???? ? ? ???????. This component is primarily related to uncertainty, whereas 
the common variation (i.e., the variance of ????) can be referred to as risk.  
3.2. Conditional volatility estimation 
Once we recover the series of filtered returns, ????? , a SV model is specified on an 
individual level, for each ? ? ?? ??7, as:  
                                                        
7 In what follows we omit the cross-sectional subscript to simplify the notation.  
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??? ? ????????      (4) 
?? ? ? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ??? ,    (5) 
where ?? and ?? are independent standard normal innovations for all ? and ? belonging 
to ??? ? ? ??. The non-observable process ? ? ???? ??? ? ? ??? appearing in equation 5 is 
the time-varying volatility with initial state distribution?????? ?? ?????? ????? ? ????. 
This centered parameterization of the model should be contrasted with the uncentered 
reparameterization provided by Kastner and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014): 
???????? ?????????     (6) 
??? ? ?????? ? ??? ?????????.    (7) 
Whether the first or the second parameterization is preferred for estimation purposes 
generally depends on the value of the ‘true’ parameters (Kastner and Frühwirth-
Schnatter, 2014). Nevertheless, both of them have intractable likelihoods and, therefore, 
MCMC sampling techniques are required for Bayesian estimation.  
Kastner and Frühwirth-Schnatter (2014) provide a strategy for overcoming the problem 
of efficiency loss due to an incorrect selection among the representations in applied 
problems. They propose interweaving (4)-(5) and (6)-(7) using the ancillarity-
sufficiency interweaving strategy (ASIS) as introduced by Yu and Meng (2011). Their 
results indicate that this strategy provides a robustly efficient sampler that always 
outperforms the more efficient parameterization with respect to all parameters, at little 
extra cost in terms of design and computation. We follow their advice to estimate the 
volatilities of the idiosyncratic shocks.  
Once the idiosyncratic stochastic volatility measures have been constructed, we are able 
to estimate the uncertainty index in the stock market as the simple average of the 
individual volatilities:  
?? ? ? ???
????
? .     (8) 
This scheme corresponds to the equally weighted average, with? ?????????
?? ?????, 
where ? ? ? ?? . Alternatives, such as using the first PC to aggregate the series of 
variances, are possible but have no grounding in econometric theory to guarantee their 
consistency in the estimation process (Jurado et al., 2013; JLN). Unlike the previously 
referenced studies by JLN, here we only use information from portfolio returns 
organized by different factor criteria; thus, there is no ex ante reason to weight each 
portfolio return using different loads. In principle, any firm might belong to any 
portfolio, and all of them are equally important in the estimation of the aggregate shock. 
Hence, it is natural to favor the equally-weighted scheme over other asymmetric 
alternatives, but note that the asymmetric scheme would be more appropriate when 
macro-variables are blended with financial or other kind of variables. 
4. Data 
In our empirical exercise we use 25 portfolios of stocks belonging to the NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ, sorted according to size and their book-to-market value, as 
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provided by Kenneth French on his website8. Those portfolios have been widely used in 
the literature examining multi-factor asset pricing models (Cochrane, 2005), and can be 
seen as a good summary of whole market dynamics. Moreover, Sentana (2004) justifies 
the use of portfolios for extracting the subjacent factors by proving that many portfolios 
converge to the factors as the number of assets increases. Clearly this does not rule out 
the fact that other possibilities might be explored in future research, such as the use of 
less well-known portfolios constructed on an industry sector basis, or using different 
factors to organize the series. 
Our data set spans from 1 July 1926 to 30 September 2014, which gives a total of 
23,321 observations. More details on the portfolio formation are provided in Davis, 
Fama and French (2000) and on Kenneth French’s web page. 
In section 5.3 we estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. The data for this 
exercise were taken from the web page of the Federal Reserve Saint Louis (FRED: 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/). Specifically, we use the Industrial Production Index; the 
total number of employees in the non-farm sector; Real Personal Consumption 
Expenditures in 2009 prices; the Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index; the 
New Orders Index known as NAPM-NOI; Average Weekly Hours of Production and 
Nonsupervisory Employees for the Manufacturing sector (the all-sector index is not 
available from the beginning of our sample); Effective Federal Funds Rate; M2 Money 
Stock in billions of dollars and Standard and Poor’s 500 index. Each series was taken 
seasonally adjusted where necessary, and the sample spans from February 1959 to 
September 2014, which is the longest period possible using these series.  
5. Results  
In this section we present our uncertainty index (section 5.1); we compare it with some 
of the main macro-uncertainty indicators (section 5.2); we analyze the relationship 
between our proposal and some real and financial variables, including policy variables 
(section 5.3); and, we perform several robustness exercises (section 5.4).  
5.1. Uncertainty index  
We estimate the GDFM using six static factors and one dynamic factor, which are 
optimal following the criteria proposed by Bai and Ng (2002) and Bai and Ng (2007), 
respectively. Based on these estimates we construct the uncertainty index by 
aggregating the conditional volatilities of the idiosyncratic residual series as explained 
in section 3. 
The daily uncertainty index is presented in Figure 1, together with the recession dates in 
the United States, as indicated by the NBER on its web site. The index peaks coincide 
with well-documented episodes of uncertainty in the financial markets and the real 
economy, including the Great Depression, the recession of 1937-38 in the US, Black 
Monday in October 1987, the bursting of the dot-com bubble and the Great Recession 
2007-2009. 
Recession dates, such as August 1929 to March 1933, May 1937 to June 1938 and 
December 2007 to June 2009, clearly correlate with the amount of uncertainty in the 
market, although interestingly, not all recessionary episodes are preceded or followed 
                                                        
8 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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by a notable uncertainty shock. For example, the uncertainty peak in the index 
corresponding to March 2000 appears one year before the economic contraction in 
March 2001. Likewise, several recessions during the decades of the 40s, 50s and 60s do 
not seem to be associated with episodes of high or even increasing uncertainty.  
More importantly, uncertainty in the stock markets appears to correlate not only with 
the volatility of fundamentals (i.e., recessions), but also with episodes of over-valuation 
or bubbles in the market, as discussed for example in Yuhn et al. (2015), namely, those 
of 1987 (Black Monday), 2000 (information technology boom) and 2007 (housing 
market boom). Indeed, these episodes may well be the main drivers of uncertainty (even 
more so than the recessions), at least in the last part of our sample. Many such episodes 
have been identified in the recent literature and they constitute a particularly active area 
of current research within the financial econometrics field (Phillips and Yu, 2011; 
Phillips et al., 2011; Homm and Breitung, 2012; Phillips et al., 2015; Anderson and 
Brooks, 2014) and even outside economics, especially in the application of statistical 
mechanics tools to financial problems (see Zhou and Sornette (2003), Sornette and 
Zhou (2004), Sornette et al. (2009), Budinski-Petković et al. (2014) and references 
therein).  
 
Figure 1: Uncertainty Index: Jan-06-27 to Sept-30-14. The first 153 observations have been discarded 
and the last 153 have been replaced by calculations using a (scaled) one-sided filter version of the GDFM
(Forni et al., 2005). The reason for doing this is that original GDFM are biased at the beginning and at the 
end of the sample, because they make use of the estimation of the variance- covariance matrices of 
order???. Grey areas correspond to NBER recession dates (peak-to-trough), including the peaks and 
troughs. The horizontal line corresponds to the 95 percentile of the empirical distribution of the index 
from Jan-40 onwards. The original measure is rescaled by a factor of 100 in the plot. 
The observation above can be rationalized under a framework of agents with 
heterogeneous beliefs and bounded rationality as the one proposed by Hommes and 
Wagener (2009). In their model, there is an endogenous switching mechanism, 
governing the proportion of financial investors who follow a ‘perfect foresight’ 
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forecasting rule (driven by market fundamentals), or alternative linear heuristics, such 
as ‘biased beliefs’ and ‘past trends’. Instabilities may follow after an increasing in the 
number of non-fundamentalist traders in the market and hence, produce the apparition 
of persistent bubbles. Uncertainty, as measured by our index, is naturally related to this 
possibility. That is, in high uncertainty regimes more agents may choose to switch to a 
non-fundamentalist rule of prediction, driving the prices away from their fundamental 
path.  
In Table 1 we report descriptive statistics for a monthly (end-of-the-month) version of 
the uncertainty index. We construct this monthly index to facilitate comparisons with 
other macro-uncertainty proxies. The skewness, kurtosis, persistence and half-life of the 
shocks for the full sample and for two sub-samples are presented (January 1927 to 
March 1940 and April 1940 to September 2014). This break date was chosen after 
testing for multiple breaks (Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003) in the autoregressive model of 
the shocks persistence (AR(1) with drift)9.  
Table 1. Summary statistics of the uncertainty index in two sub-samples 
  Sample period 
Statistic Jan 1927-Sept 2014 
Jan 1927-Mar 
1940 
Apr 1940-
Sept 2014 
Skewness 1.60 0.32 1.70 
Kurtosis 4.74 1.97 6.62 
Persistence, AR(1) 0.993 0.963 0.978 
Half-life: months (years) 101 (8.42) 18.3 (1.53) 31.9 (2.65) 
 
Table 1 shows that using the full sample to calculate persistence can lead to a spurious 
estimation of the summary statistics. Indeed, the sample distribution of the uncertainty 
index in the two sub-samples looks quite distinct. In the first part of the sample, 
persistence is smaller and, therefore, the ‘shocks’ disappear in a shorter period of time 
(1.53 years) than is the case in the second sub-sample (2.65 years). There are fewer 
observations distant from the mean and, lastly, the distribution presents a slightly 
asymmetric behavior (skewness equal to 0.32). In contrast, even when the second part 
of the estimation presents shocks of a smaller magnitude (Figure 1), the distribution that 
characterizes them tends to generate a higher number of ‘outliers’ (kurtosis equal to 
6.92) and they are more likely to be above than below the mean (1.7 is the asymmetric 
coefficient). This behavior may be interpreted as uncertainty showing some degree of 
inconsistency across time, which is related to the knightian framework, in which 
uncertainty is indeed understood as a non-predictable state.  
Our estimations of persistence of macro-uncertainty are lower than those reported 
elsewhere, for example, those provided by JLN. The latter estimate a persistence of 
53.58 months, while in the second part of our sample our estimation is of 31.9 months 
(41.2 months from Jan. 1960 to Sept. 2014). This could be interpreted as evidence that 
financial-uncertainty shocks are not as persistent as macro-uncertainty shocks. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that JLN also report the persistence and half-lives of 
frequently used proxies for uncertainty, including the VXO and the cross-sectional 
standard deviation of the returns. They show that these uncertainty-related measures are 
far less persistent than are macro-uncertainty shocks (with half-lives of 4.13 and 1.92 
months). Thus, the half-life and persistence of our uncertainty measure are more similar 
                                                        
9 See Perron (2006) for a survey of this literature. 
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to those of the macro-uncertainty shocks than to those derived from the volatility 
measures.  
5.2. Correlations with macro-uncertainty indexes  
The closest measure of uncertainty to ours, methodologically speaking, is the 
uncertainty index proposed by JLN, although their proposal might be interpreted more 
directly as a ‘macro-uncertainty’ indicator, given its emphasis on economic variables as 
opposed to purely financial ones. Given these circumstances, it seems to be a good 
candidate with which to compare our index while seeking to identify any convergent 
and divergent paths. In order to compare the indexes, we first reduce our sample to fit 
theirs. Our resampled data start in January 1960 and end in May 201310. After so doing, 
we recalculate our uncertainty index by aiming to use the same dates as those employed 
by JLN. Second, we take the end-of-the-month value of our index, to resemble their 
index frequency (monthly).  
The results are reported in Figure 2. The shaded areas in the plot correspond to periods 
of ‘high’ correlation. The Pearson’s correlation for the full sample between the indexes 
is barely above 22%, which could be interpreted, at first glance, to indicate that different 
forces lie behind the macro-uncertainty and the financial-uncertainty. However, this 
correlation seems very volatile. We also calculate moving-window correlations of five 
years during the sample and here our findings are more informative than the static 
correlation. The correlation remains above 50% for most of the period (left panel). 
Moreover, for the last part of the sample (from around February 2009 to May 2013), 
this correlation remained above 90%, revealing practically no difference in the indexes’ 
dynamics. Even higher values were reached during the 70s and we observe correlations 
between 40 and 80% in the period from May 1994 to February 2003 (right panel). There 
are also two periods in which this correlation became negative, specifically from 
January 1992 to August 1993 and December 2005 to September 2007. After these short 
phases, the indexes started to move in the same direction once again, and in both cases 
with a stronger impetus than before.  
Finally, an analysis of the levels of the uncertainty indexes shows them to be 
particularly different during the periods from March 1979 to May 1983 and July 1998 to 
January 2003. Our intuition regarding the explanation for these divergent paths during 
these periods is that while uncertainty in the financial markets is driven significantly by 
bubble episodes, such episodes are not always the drivers of the recessions in the real 
economy and, therefore, cannot be related on a one-to-one basis with macro-
uncertainty. Thus, the financial-uncertainty index highlights uncertainty associated with 
bubble episodes (for instance, during the dot.com collapse) that did not materialize as 
strong recessionary phases in the real economy and which, therefore, are not captured 
by the JLN-uncertainty index. In the same vein, recessionary episodes not directly 
related to the financial market (such as those from 1979 to 1983) are not especially 
pronounced in our financial-uncertainty indicator.  
                                                        
10  The JLN-index is publicly available for this period on Sidney Ludvigson’s web page: 
http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/ludvigsons/ 
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Figure 2: Uncertainty Comparisons I. The solid line represents our Uncertainty Index (U), while the 
dotted line represents the Jurado-Ludvigson-Ng’s Index (JLN) with forecast horizon ? ? ?, both from 
Apr-65 to May-13. In the panel on the left, the shaded areas correspond to correlation periods above 0.5. 
In the panel on the right, the shaded areas are the actual correlations. Correlations are measured on the 
right axis of each panel. Correlations were calculated using rolling, moving windows of five years, 
starting from January 1960.  
We also compare our index with the VIX, another frequent proxy for macro- and 
financial-uncertainty (Figure 3), but which is only available after January 1990. We 
found a correlation of 65.2% using the full sample. The dynamics of the VIX and the 
uncertainty index appear to be largely similar with a correlation above 70% for the last 
ten years of the sample. However, these dynamics are considerably different 
(considering the correlation levels) for the first ten years of the sample. Here again, the 
results could be linked to the fact that volatility as a risk measure is inversely related to 
the presence of over-valuation in the stock markets, whereas over-valuation appears to 
be positively related to uncertainty.  
 
Figure 3: Uncertainty Comparisons II. The solid line represents our uncertainty index (U), while the 
dotted line represents the VIX, both from Jan-90 to Sept-14. Shaded areas correspond to the five-year 
rolling correlations and, therefore, start only after Jan-95. Correlations are measured along the right axis. 
5.3. VAR dynamics: Uncertainty, economic activity and policy variables
In this section, we explore the dynamic relationship between our uncertainty index and 
some macroeconomic and financial variables. To do so, we use the model proposed by 
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Christiano et al. (2005). This model has been widely studied in the literature and is, 
therefore, useful for comparing our uncertainty estimates. The model is given in 
reduced form by: 
?? ? ???????? ? ??,     (9) 
where, ?? ? ?????? ??? ???? ???? is a matrix ?? ? ?? containing the ?  column-vectors of 
the model. ??? contains slow-moving variables which do not react contemporaneously 
to a monetary policy shock: Production, Employment, Consumption, Inflation, New 
Orders, Wages and Labor. ?  refers to the Federal Funds Rate, understood as the 
monetary policy instrument. ???  refers to the fastest variables, which are assumed to 
respond contemporaneously to the policy innovation, such as: the Stock Market Index 
and M2. Finally, we place our Uncertainty Index U in last position (as do JLN and 
Bloom, 2009)11. We estimate a VAR with 12 lags, as opposed to the four quarters used 
in Christiano et al. (2005) to cover the same time-span. All the variables enter in log-
levels, with the exceptions of the Federal Funds Rate and Uncertainty, which enter in 
original units, and M2, which enters in growth rates. We recover the structural 
innovations by means of a Cholesky factorization of the variance-covariance matrix. As 
is well known, the Cholesky decomposition implies a certain ordering of the set of 
variables, depending on whether they react or not to other variables contemporaneously. 
Following Christiano et al. (2005), the variables are sorted from more exogenous to 
more endogenous as stated above. The impulse response functions are presented in 
Figure 4.  
The reactions of Production and Employment to uncertainty shocks have been studied 
elsewhere, for example in JLN and Bloom (2009). The former report very similar 
results to ours even when using their uncertainty index, which requires considerably 
more information, processing time and modeling design than are required by our index 
(see also section 5.4). Production reacts negatively to uncertainty increments and the 
persistence of the shock extends beyond the two-year horizon. In the sixth months after 
the innovation, 10.5% of the forecast error of the production series is explained by the 
uncertainty shock, and up to 23.8% is explained 12 months on12. 
  
                                                        
11 See section 4 for a more detailed description of the data used in this section. 
12 See Table 2 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4: Economic Dynamics under Uncertainty. We use a VAR (12) comprising 11 variables. The 
axes are in percentages but the Federal Funds Rate is in basic points. The figure shows the reaction of the 
variables to an unexpected increment of uncertainty. The estimation period runs from February 1959 to 
September 2014. Confidence bands (86%) are calculated using bootstrapping techniques as explained in 
Efron and Tibshirani (1993). The variables are defined as: IP: Industrial Production Index, E: 
Employment, NO: New Orders, C: Consumption, R: Federal Funds Rate, SP: Standard and Poor’s 500. 
Analogously, although at a smaller magnitude, employment decreases following a 
positive uncertainty shock and the impact persists for two and a half years (that is, six 
months more than in the case of production)13. Neither we nor JLN find any evidence 
supporting the ‘rebound’ effect proposed by Bloom (2009) in the case of production. 
However, the rebound effect is evident when analyzing the New Orders variable, which 
is a better proxy for current investment. First, new orders decrease in the face of 
uncertainty – a negative impact that lasts approximately eight months, but there is a 
statistically significant rebound effect in months 16 to 19. The reason why a similar 
effect is not detected in the production dynamics could be that following the original 
uncertainty shocks, negative feedback is obtained from consumption and expected 
demand.  
Although there are theoretical claims explicitly linking uncertainty shocks and 
consumption (see, for instance, Romer, 1990), little empirical evidence has been 
presented to document this relationship. Here, we find that after an increment in 
uncertainty, consumption is severely affected (indeed, more or less in the same 
                                                        
13 JLN report an impact of their uncertainty shock on production that persists for more than 60 
months. We also find that the IRF tends to stabilize at a lower level following a shock, as can be seen 
in Figure 4, although this is only true for the average level. Note that the bootstrapped confidence 
intervals of our exercise prevent us from fixing the effects beyond three years as statistically 
different from zero.  
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proportion as production, and more so than employment). However, the shock tends to 
disappear more quickly (1.3 years before the upper confidence band reaches zero), but it 
is also apparent that it causes the series to stabilize at a lower level relative to that of the 
production series. 
In line with the theory, financial prices, such as the stock market index, are significantly 
affected by uncertainty in the financial markets. Indeed, the marked fall in the market 
index in the face of uncertainty, and the stabilization of the sequence at a lower level, is 
consistent with the theoretical discussion in Bansal and Yaron (2004). Basically, the 
intuition is tied to the fact that markets do not like uncertainty and after an increase in 
uncertainty, the discount of the expected cash flows is greater, causing the market to 
reduce the price of the stock.  
As can be seen from Table 2 in the Appendix, a variance decomposition of the forecast 
errors of the series confirms the importance of uncertainty as a driver of the economy’s 
dynamics. One year after the original structural innovation, it accounts for 23.8% of the 
variance in production, 19.5% of new orders, 13.2% of employment and 15.9% of the 
stock market prices. In all cases, it is the second or third largest source of variation. It 
also affects other series, albeit to a lesser degree, including consumption (7.6%) and 
Federal Funds (4.7%), being in these cases the fourth or fifth cause of variation among 
the eleven variables considered.  
Lastly, the Federal Funds Rate also seems to be sensitive to uncertainty. In the face of 
an uncertainty shock the Federal Reserve tends to reduce the interest rate (thereby 
confirming that the reduction in equity prices is due to uncertainty and not to possible 
confounding interest movements). The reduction is particularly persistent during the 
first year before it begins to disappear. Nevertheless, the uncertainty shock only 
accounts for between 4 and 5% of the total variation in the Fed rate according to the 
variance decomposition.  
The Cholesky identification strategy allows us to distinguish the effect in the reverse 
direction; in other words, it enables us to answer the question: Does an expansionary 
monetary policy decrease uncertainty? As can be observed in Figure 5, a loosening 
monetary policy does affect uncertainty. The effects are expected to occur with a lag of 
one year, to last for a further year, and after this period, to disappear. This finding is in 
line with similar effects documented by Bekaert et al. (2013), although they use non-
corrected uncertainty measures and an alternative strategy to differentiate it from risk.  
Our results in this direction add to the research field by exploring the relationship 
between policy intervention and uncertainty. However, the effects are small in 
magnitude (see Table 2 in the Appendix), with between 2 and 6% being due to the 
monetary policy innovations.  
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Figure 5: Policy intervention and uncertainty. We use a VAR (12) comprising 11 variables. The axes 
are in basic points and units, respectively. We replicate the left panel from Figure 5 and we multiply by 
minus one the response to an increase in the Federal Funds Rate, to be consistent with the text. The 
estimation period runs from February 1959 to September 2014. Confidence bands (86%) are calculated 
using bootstrapping techniques as explained in Efron and Tibshirani (1993).  
Finally, in Figure 6, using our proposed index and JLN’s index, we compare the 
responses of the variables facing uncertainty. However, the qualitative and quantitative 
results reported above do not vary significantly depending on the uncertainty measure 
used. 
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Figure 6: Economic Dynamics under Uncertainty. Comparison of the JLN and U Indexes. We use a 
VAR (12) comprising 11 variables. The figure displays the reaction of the variables to an unexpected 
increment in two standardized uncertainty measures, the U index (solid line) and the JLN index (dotted 
line). The estimation period for the U index runs from February 1959 to September 2014 whereas the JLN 
index is only publicly available from July 1960 to May 2013 on one of its author’s web pages; therefore, 
we use this latter period to estimate the IRFs in this case. The variables are defined as: IP: Industrial 
Production Index, E: Employment, NO: New Orders, C: Consumption, R: Federal Funds Rate, SP: 
Standard and Poor’s 500. 
5.4. Robustness 
We perform several robustness exercises varying the econometric methodology 
employed to extract the idiosyncratic component. We estimate the uncertainty index 
using DFM instead of GDFM; we also use the ‘one-sided’ filter version of the GDFM 
proposed by Forni et al. (2005) as opposed to the two-sided original GDFM, for the full 
sample; we estimate the index as the stochastic volatility without using any factor 
model to extract the idiosyncratic component and, finally, we estimate the idiosyncratic 
component in a recursive fashion, recalculating each model with rolling windows of 80 
days (approx. one quarter). The latter approach speaks directly about parameter 
stability. The main results are summarized in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Robustness exercises. The uncertainty index using GDFM (solid line) is compared with 
different alternatives: a DFM (top left), a one-sided filter version of the GDFM (top right), a recursive 
algorithm (bottom left) and a conditional volatility measure of the original series (bottom right). All the 
indexes have been standardized to make proper comparisons. 
In general the uncertainty index behaves in a very similar fashion, regardless of the 
factor methodology used to extract the idiosyncratic components of the series. Nor does 
it change when we use recursive estimations. Nevertheless, its behavior is considerably 
different to that of the stochastic volatility of the original series. This, however, is not 
surprising and is indeed in-line with previous findings in the literature. Volatility 
measures tend to overestimate the uncertainty of the economy because they confuse 
uncertainty with risk or risk aversion. 
6. Conclusions 
We propose an index of time-varying financial uncertainty. The construction of this 
index is relatively simple as it does not rely on excessive data mining devices nor does 
it have to satisfy demanding information requirements. We construct the index on a 
daily basis, for the United States’ economy between 1927 and 2014. As such, the index 
can be used to perform event studies, that is, to evaluate the impact of policy treatments 
on economic uncertainty, thanks to the higher frequency it offers compared to other 
proposals. 
Our estimations allow us to identify several periods of uncertainty, some of which 
coincide with well-documented episodes, including major recessions, wars, and political 
upheavals. Others, especially those occurring in more recent decades, are more closely 
associated with bubble regimes in the stock market. We also document a change in the 
persistence of uncertainty between 1940 and 2014 compared to that recorded between 
1927 and 1940. Current uncertainty is more persistent and is plagued with more extreme 
observations, although current periods tend to be smaller in magnitude than earlier 
periods.  
We discuss the circumstances under which our index is a better measure of financial 
uncertainty and when it is in agreement with measures available elsewhere. We 
conclude that significant departures between macro-uncertainty and financial 
uncertainty can be expected during bubble episodes and we present evidence of this. 
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However, the economic dynamics that we document here (using a VAR model) are 
consistent with theoretical expectations and previous empirical studies (when available). 
For example, we find that after an uncertainty shock, production and employment react 
negatively and the effects of the shock tend to disappear slowly. We also present novel 
empirical evidence regarding the negative effect of uncertainty on consumption, 
inventory investment (including overshooting) and stock market prices.  
Finally, we explore the relationship between uncertainty and policy variables. We find 
that there is indeed a relation between the reference interest rate in the economy and 
uncertainty. The interest rate tends to decrease in the face of an uncertainty shock, while 
the uncertainty shock decreases following a loosening of the monetary policy position, 
with a lag of one-year. However, this latter effect is very small in terms of accounting 
for the total variation of the forecast errors of the uncertainty variable. This result raises 
questions regarding the capability of the central banks to combat uncertainty by means 
of traditional monetary policy. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In the estimations we make use of some routines from the web page of Serena Ng 
(http://www.columbia.edu/~sn2294/) to estimate the DFM, and to select the optimal 
number of static and dynamic factors. To estimate the GDFM, both, one-side and two-
sides filters, we use codes from the web page of Mario Forni. 
(http://morgana.unimore.it/forni_mario/matlab.htm). To estimate stochastic volatilities 
we use the r-package ‘stochvol’ (Kastner, 2016), to estimate structural breaks in the 
index we employ the r-package ‘strucchange’ and to estimate the VAR model the r-
package ‘vars’ was used. 
 
Table 2: Variance Decomposition of the Forecast Errors 
  Industrial Production 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 95.2% 68.2% 41.8% 23.7% 16.8% 95.2% 
Employment 0.7% 3.6% 3.2% 2.1% 5.3% 7.1% 
Consumption 0.1% 0.2% 1.0% 0.8% 1.7% 2.2% 
Inflation 0.3% 0.2% 2.4% 15.4% 17.0% 18.7% 
New Orders 2.5% 8.1% 4.6% 4.9% 3.6% 8.2% 
Wage 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 1.0% 1.1% 
Hours 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.9% 
R 0.0% 1.6% 4.5% 12.8% 26.0% 26.3% 
S&P500 0.0% 5.0% 11.8% 9.8% 6.8% 13.7% 
M2 0.0% 1.8% 6.3% 7.7% 7.7% 7.9% 
Uncertainty 0.3% 10.5% 23.8% 21.7% 13.7% 25.3% 
 
 
  New Orders 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 10.9% 7.5% 8.4% 7.7% 7.3% 10.9% 
Employment 3.1% 5.3% 5.9% 5.4% 5.0% 6.1% 
Consumption 2.9% 1.9% 1.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.1% 
Inflation 1.9% 2.7% 9.2% 12.6% 12.6% 12.8% 
New Orders 78.7% 48.2% 39.9% 33.8% 31.5% 78.7% 
Wage 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 
Hours 0.5% 0.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.5% 1.7% 
R 0.0% 5.7% 7.2% 8.8% 9.7% 10.5% 
S&P500 1.6% 4.9% 4.5% 10.5% 12.7% 13.3% 
M2 0.2% 1.2% 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 
Uncertainty 0.1% 21.5% 19.5% 16.4% 16.4% 22.6% 
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  Consumption 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 2.9% 5.3% 3.9% 2.1% 1.7% 6.7% 
Employment 0.7% 4.8% 3.5% 1.8% 3.4% 5.3% 
Consumption 93.8% 62.7% 45.0% 31.9% 25.4% 93.8% 
Inflation 0.6% 6.4% 14.4% 24.3% 25.4% 26.1% 
New Orders 0.3% 0.8% 2.1% 5.0% 4.8% 5.2% 
Wage 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Hours 0.0% 0.8% 1.0% 0.9% 0.7% 1.1% 
R 0.5% 7.4% 12.1% 19.0% 23.6% 23.8% 
S&P500 0.7% 3.9% 4.8% 3.3% 2.1% 5.0% 
M2 0.2% 2.3% 5.1% 6.6% 9.5% 10.8% 
Uncertainty 0.3% 5.3% 7.6% 4.7% 3.1% 7.8% 
 
 
 
  Employment 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 32.8% 29.5% 19.1% 11.8% 8.8% 35.1% 
Employment 66.1% 53.2% 42.5% 26.3% 11.5% 66.1% 
Consumption 0.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8% 
Inflation 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 9.0% 13.3% 14.1% 
New Orders 0.7% 4.4% 2.3% 1.9% 2.0% 4.5% 
Wage 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.8% 1.4% 1.4% 
Hours 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 1.8% 2.2% 2.3% 
R 0.0% 2.5% 7.4% 19.6% 41.4% 44.5% 
S&P500 0.1% 3.9% 10.4% 9.2% 7.5% 12.5% 
M2 0.0% 0.9% 3.3% 4.2% 3.4% 4.2% 
Uncertainty 0.0% 4.6% 13.2% 14.7% 8.2% 15.5% 
 
 
 
  Standard & Poor's 500 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 0.3% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 1.2% 1.2% 
Employment 0.1% 1.3% 2.7% 4.1% 5.6% 6.2% 
Consumption 0.3% 0.9% 1.8% 1.8% 1.6% 1.8% 
Inflation 0.5% 0.4% 4.0% 6.9% 5.8% 6.9% 
New Orders 0.3% 1.3% 3.8% 5.7% 4.6% 5.7% 
Wage 0.0% 0.2% 2.2% 4.3% 8.0% 9.0% 
Hours 0.6% 1.0% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.0% 
R 1.0% 1.5% 1.1% 1.2% 2.1% 2.1% 
S&P500 94.5% 73.6% 63.6% 54.1% 44.7% 94.5% 
M2 0.2% 3.4% 3.6% 3.9% 3.7% 4.0% 
Uncertainty 2.2% 15.9% 15.9% 16.7% 21.7% 23.4% 
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Federal Funds -R 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 0.0% 6.4% 5.4% 4.9% 6.2% 6.5% 
Employment 0.0% 1.7% 6.5% 8.6% 8.2% 9.1% 
Consumption 0.0% 0.5% 2.5% 3.3% 8.5% 11.0% 
Inflation 0.0% 2.2% 3.7% 3.5% 4.0% 4.0% 
New Orders 0.0% 10.6% 11.2% 9.2% 7.6% 11.2% 
Wage 0.0% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 
Hours 0.0% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.3% 
R 0.0% 72.8% 55.9% 47.8% 42.2% 91.7% 
S&P500 0.0% 1.7% 6.8% 13.3% 14.4% 16.9% 
M2 0.0% 0.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.5% 1.7% 
Uncertainty 0.0% 1.9% 4.7% 5.9% 5.4% 6.1% 
 
 
  Uncertainty 
              
Period 1 6 12 24 48 Max 
              
Ind. Production 0.5% 1.9% 2.4% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 
Employment 0.1% 0.8% 1.0% 1.4% 1.2% 1.5% 
Consumption 0.0% 0.5% 1.6% 1.3% 1.1% 1.6% 
Inflation 0.4% 2.6% 5.9% 4.8% 5.6% 6.0% 
New Orders 0.1% 0.3% 0.4% 1.0% 2.0% 2.1% 
Wage 0.0% 0.7% 3.7% 3.5% 3.3% 4.3% 
Hours 0.0% 0.7% 1.4% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2% 
R 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 4.0% 4.8% 5.0% 
S&P500 1.3% 3.8% 7.1% 22.6% 28.2% 28.6% 
M2 1.8% 3.1% 3.1% 2.6% 3.3% 3.4% 
Uncertainty 95.7% 85.6% 73.2% 54.9% 46.1% 95.7% 
 
NOTE: We use a VAR (12) comprising 11 variables, in the following Cholesky-order from 
contemporaneously exogenous to contemporaneously endogenous: Production, Employment, 
Consumption, Inflation, New Orders, Wages, Labor, ? (Federal Funds Rate), Stock Market Index, M2 
and the Uncertainty Index. All the variables are in logs except the Fed rate in percentage, the uncertainty 
index in units and M2 in growth rates. 
 
Highlights 
? A daily index of time-varying stock market uncertainty is proposed. 
? Stock market uncertainty reacts to economic recessions, but also to bubble 
episodes. 
? Uncertainty impacts negatively investment, consumption, production and 
employment. 
? The impact of uncertainty on stock prices is negative and persistent. 
 
